What risks does cooperation with China pose for Kazakhstan?
Written by Azamat Yesdauletov
December 1, 2019
Chinese companies produce 24% of Kazakhstan's oil and intend to increase their presence in other industries. China plans to invest $27 billion in 55 projects in the mining and metallurgical industry, energy, mechanical engineering, chemical and food industries, etc. The authorities assure that investments only benefit Kazakhstan, but experience and other countries indicate the potential risk.
When it comes to China, officials most often focus on economic benefits, such as economic diversification and availability of cheap money, and avoid addressing potential threats. However, the current situation in Kazakhstan and the world shows that the concerns of the population are not unfounded.
When it comes to China, officials most often focus on economic benefits, such as economic diversification and availability of cheap money, and avoid addressing potential threats. However, the current situation in Kazakhstan and the world shows that the concerns of the population are not unfounded.
Current situation
Chinese workers in Kazakhstan
The main fear of Kazakhstanis is the migration of neighboring Chinese, whose annual population growth equals half of Kazakhstan's population. The authorities are making every effort to dispel this fear and reduce anti-Chinese sentiment. But are there really that many workers from China in Kazakhstan?
China is the leader in attracting foreign labor in the Republic of Kazakhstan: in 2010-2017, about 100 thousand Chinese workers arrived (one third of the total foreign labor force). This is more than twice the figure of Turkey, which is in second place.
Chinese workers in Kazakhstan
The main fear of Kazakhstanis is the migration of neighboring Chinese, whose annual population growth equals half of Kazakhstan's population. The authorities are making every effort to dispel this fear and reduce anti-Chinese sentiment. But are there really that many workers from China in Kazakhstan?
China is the leader in attracting foreign labor in the Republic of Kazakhstan: in 2010-2017, about 100 thousand Chinese workers arrived (one third of the total foreign labor force). This is more than twice the figure of Turkey, which is in second place.
In recent years, there has also been an increase in the number of Chinese workers and their share in the total foreign labor force.
From 2013 to 2017, the number of Chinese workers doubled, and their share increased from 27 to 43%.
From 2013 to 2017, the number of Chinese workers doubled, and their share increased from 27 to 43%.
Figure 2. Number of Chinese workers and their share of all foreign workers in Kazakhstan, thousand people
Based on data from the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection [2]
The large number of Chinese workers is associated with increased investment.
However, there is no correlation between the labor force and the volume of investment. For example, despite the fact that the United States, the Netherlands and Switzerland are the main investors in Kazakhstan, they attract significantly fewer workers.
However, there is no correlation between the labor force and the volume of investment. For example, despite the fact that the United States, the Netherlands and Switzerland are the main investors in Kazakhstan, they attract significantly fewer workers.
Figure 3.
According to the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Center for Labor Resources Development [1; 3]
The growth of the foreign workforce is driven not so much by the volume of investments as by the sectors of investment. For example, the main reason for the increase in Chinese workers in Kazakhstan is the construction of the Western Europe – Western China highway. In the medium term, the attraction of additional Chinese workers is possible, as 55 projects are being implemented in sectors where Kazakhstan has a high demand for foreign labor (construction, mining and metallurgical complex, and manufacturing) [1].
Diversification of the economy
When explaining Chinese investment projects, the authorities emphasize that they are focused on the manufacturing industry. However, significant shifts towards economic diversification should not be expected. According to the Statistics Committee, foreign investments account for only 3.3% of total investments in fixed assets.
Diversification of the economy
When explaining Chinese investment projects, the authorities emphasize that they are focused on the manufacturing industry. However, significant shifts towards economic diversification should not be expected. According to the Statistics Committee, foreign investments account for only 3.3% of total investments in fixed assets.
Figure 4.Investments in fixed assets by sources of financing for 2018, %
Based on data from the Statistics Committee of the Ministry of National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan [4]
The experience of Africa also shows that China is not interested in developing high-tech industries in the countries it invests in. After 20 years of close investment cooperation, the structure of trade between the countries has not changed—Africa exports raw materials (oil, iron ore, and cotton), while it imports finished goods (equipment, electronics, and textiles) [5].
Figure 5. Dynamics of Chinese direct investments in Kazakhstan, USD billion
Based on data from the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan [3]
National debt
Kazakhstanis are also concerned about the amount of government debt owed to China. According to officials, the population has no reason to worry, because Kazakhstan does not have a national debt to China, but there is only a debt guaranteed by the state in the amount of $ 1.2 billion, which was taken for the construction of highways. However, if we consider the external debt of the public sector in a broader definition, i.e., taking into account state-controlled organizations, the real amount is 3.5 times higher - $4.3 billion. This accounts for about 40% of the total external debt to China. While the use of the borrowed $1.2 billion is clear, officials do not provide explanations for the remaining $3.1 billion. Additionally, this figure is expected to grow as Kazakhstan plans to borrow an additional $300 million from China for the development of customs infrastructure.
Kazakhstanis are also concerned about the amount of government debt owed to China. According to officials, the population has no reason to worry, because Kazakhstan does not have a national debt to China, but there is only a debt guaranteed by the state in the amount of $ 1.2 billion, which was taken for the construction of highways. However, if we consider the external debt of the public sector in a broader definition, i.e., taking into account state-controlled organizations, the real amount is 3.5 times higher - $4.3 billion. This accounts for about 40% of the total external debt to China. While the use of the borrowed $1.2 billion is clear, officials do not provide explanations for the remaining $3.1 billion. Additionally, this figure is expected to grow as Kazakhstan plans to borrow an additional $300 million from China for the development of customs infrastructure.
Debt problems are considered one of the main risks of cooperation with China. According to the Center for Global Development, Asian, African and European countries owe the Chinese about $8 trillion [7].
Figure 6. External debt to China as of April 1, 2019, USD billion
Easy money with severe consequences
China provides low-interest loans for a long term without any extra obligations, which makes it much more attractive than its Western partners. However, with this approach by China, borrowers often find themselves in a debt trap. Having failed to pay off their debts, countries are forced to provide strategic assets in the form of collateral. In 2015, Sri Lanka gave the port of Hambantota to China for 99 years, as it could not repay the debt for its construction [9].
The government of Tajikistan granted China the right to mine gold at the Upper Kumarg deposit to cover the debt for the construction of the Dushanbe-2 Thermal Power Plant [7]. Pakistan, Malaysia and 17 African countries also find it difficult to pay off their debts to China [10].
The main reason for debt traps is the lack of transparency and corruption in transactions. Newly elected Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan called huge bribes the main reason for “unprofitable megaprojects.” Meanwhile, in Malaysia, a $20 billion railway modernization project was suspended and former Prime Minister Najib Razak was detained on suspicion of large-scale corruption [10]. Often, Chinese entrepreneurs themselves initiate corruption schemes.
According to a Mckinsey study, up to 87% of Chinese businessmen in Africa admitted to paying bribes [11]. The lack of transparency allows the Chinese side to maximize their own profits and implement overpriced projects with dubious economic effects. According to the China-Africa research group at Johns Hopkins University, Kenya has significantly overpaid for the construction of a $4 billion railway, the payback period of which will take at least 20 years [12].
According to the project, Kenya should pay $ 120 million annually to the Chinese side, while in 2018 the profitability of the railway amounted to only $ 57 million. The Kenyan side is concerned that the project requires significant subsidies from the state and, in case of non-payment, the country will lose the port of Mombasa [13].
The government of Tajikistan granted China the right to mine gold at the Upper Kumarg deposit to cover the debt for the construction of the Dushanbe-2 Thermal Power Plant [7]. Pakistan, Malaysia and 17 African countries also find it difficult to pay off their debts to China [10].
The main reason for debt traps is the lack of transparency and corruption in transactions. Newly elected Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan called huge bribes the main reason for “unprofitable megaprojects.” Meanwhile, in Malaysia, a $20 billion railway modernization project was suspended and former Prime Minister Najib Razak was detained on suspicion of large-scale corruption [10]. Often, Chinese entrepreneurs themselves initiate corruption schemes.
According to a Mckinsey study, up to 87% of Chinese businessmen in Africa admitted to paying bribes [11]. The lack of transparency allows the Chinese side to maximize their own profits and implement overpriced projects with dubious economic effects. According to the China-Africa research group at Johns Hopkins University, Kenya has significantly overpaid for the construction of a $4 billion railway, the payback period of which will take at least 20 years [12].
According to the project, Kenya should pay $ 120 million annually to the Chinese side, while in 2018 the profitability of the railway amounted to only $ 57 million. The Kenyan side is concerned that the project requires significant subsidies from the state and, in case of non-payment, the country will lose the port of Mombasa [13].
Are there any risks for Kazakhstan?
The potential for corruption in deals is also the greatest risk for Kazakhstan. According to the Corruption Perceptions Index, Kazakhstan is ranked 7 places below Pakistan, which is experiencing significant debt difficulties due to the lack of transparency in mutual projects.
It is noteworthy that even countries with significantly higher Corruption Perceptions Index scores than Kazakhstan, such as Malaysia and Sri Lanka, have fallen into China's debt trap. One of the reasons may be the Chinese side's ability to please and convince officials of the need to make decisions that are beneficial to the Chinese.
For example, according to the Time publication, the management of Huawei's Kazakhstan branch requires employees to establish close ties (give gifts, organize joint dinners, fishing, trips to China) with employees of government agencies and national companies responsible for procurement of goods and services [15].
The efforts of Chinese entrepreneurs, coupled with insufficient transparency, increase the possibility of agreements that do not meet the interests of Kazakhstan.
For example, according to the Time publication, the management of Huawei's Kazakhstan branch requires employees to establish close ties (give gifts, organize joint dinners, fishing, trips to China) with employees of government agencies and national companies responsible for procurement of goods and services [15].
The efforts of Chinese entrepreneurs, coupled with insufficient transparency, increase the possibility of agreements that do not meet the interests of Kazakhstan.
Figure 7. Corruption Perceptions Index Country Rankings, 2018
Based on data from Transparency International [14]
One prominent example is the implementation of the economically inefficient and overrated LRT project in Astana. In July of this year, President K. Tokayev criticized its construction, highlighting the inexpediency of launching the LRT with a capacity of 146,000 passengers, while the actual daily passenger flow on this route is only 2,000 people [16].
The cost of the project also raises many questions. The construction of one kilometer of ground metro in Nur-Sultan ($67-80 million/km) costs three to four times more than a similar project in Uzbekistan ($21.2 million/km) and 34-60% more expensive than even in Dubai ($50 million tenge/km) [17; 18].
The cost of the project also raises many questions. The construction of one kilometer of ground metro in Nur-Sultan ($67-80 million/km) costs three to four times more than a similar project in Uzbekistan ($21.2 million/km) and 34-60% more expensive than even in Dubai ($50 million tenge/km) [17; 18].
Figure 8. Budget expenditures and economic impact of state programs and the LRT project
*741 billion tenge - initial cost, current cost 585 billion tenge Based on data from State programs[17; 19]
Initially, the project was estimated at $1.9 billion (741 billion tenge) (excluding operating costs), which is comparable to the amount that Kazakhstan spent on the development of the manufacturing industry in 2015-2019 (878 billion tenge) and five times (!) more than the Government spends on other priority areas such as support for SMEs (146 billion tenge) and digitalization (141 billion tenge). At the same time, if state programs provide for a specific economic effect in the form of growth in the manufacturing industry, labor productivity, exports, etc., then the expected effect of LRT is unclear [17; 19].
The fact that questions about this project have appeared after four years and only as a result of criticism of the President indicates the lack of mechanisms for screening out dubious projects at the initial stages.
Additionally, corruption criminal cases against the management of organizations operating with Chinese funds, such as "Astana LRT" and KazAvtoZhol, signal low effectiveness in project implementation.
The fact that questions about this project have appeared after four years and only as a result of criticism of the President indicates the lack of mechanisms for screening out dubious projects at the initial stages.
Additionally, corruption criminal cases against the management of organizations operating with Chinese funds, such as "Astana LRT" and KazAvtoZhol, signal low effectiveness in project implementation.
Protection of interests
Another potential disadvantage for Kazakhstan may be the lack of negotiating power in further deepening cooperation with China. Joining the EAEU has demonstrated Kazakhstan's inability to sufficiently protect its interests when interacting with a more influential partner. Optimistic expectations for entering the Russian market with a population of 145 million people have not been met.
Over the years of integration, the structure of trade with Russia has not changed—imports account for the lion's share (70%). Kazakhstan experiences an annual trade deficit of about $10 billion (approximately 4% of GDP) [20]. Kazakhstan imports 40% of all products from Russia, while it exports only 9% of its own exports to Russia [20; 21]. The main barriers to Kazakhstani products entering the Russian market are non-tariff barriers such as various certifications, additional regional requirements, informal orders, and so on [22].
Figure 9. Dynamics of trade turnover between Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation, billion US dollars
Based on the data of the Statistics Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan [20]
Additionally, due to Kazakhstan's "low negotiating power," Russia actively promotes initiatives that benefit its own businesses at the expense of Kazakhstan's.
The Economic Development and Integration Commission, which is supervised by the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, plans to decide not to extend the tariff exemption for imports of medium- and long-haul civil aircraft to the EAEU until 2032.
The Economic Development and Integration Commission, which is supervised by the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, plans to decide not to extend the tariff exemption for imports of medium- and long-haul civil aircraft to the EAEU until 2032.
Figure 10. Share of the Russian Federation in the import and export of the Republic of Kazakhstan
Based on data from the Statistics Committee of the Ministry of National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan [20; 21]
This measure will lead to additional expenses for Kazakhstani airlines amounting to $500 million [23]. In addition, the Union of Sugar Producers of Russia lobbied for the abolition of privileges for the import of imported sugar to Kazakhstan, which will lead to a decrease in the profitability of the domestic confectionery business due to an increase in the cost of finished products [24]. The unequal partnership within the EAEU negatively impacts Kazakhstani businesses and, overall, the economy of Kazakhstan.
A similar situation may occur with economic rapprochement with China. The disproportionate economic and political weight with China puts Kazakhstan in a clearly losing position when disagreements arise.As the experience of unresolved problems of transboundary rivers and the ongoing oppression of Kazakhs in Xinjiang shows, China takes a principled position in clashes of interests, despite assurances of friendship from high tribunes [25].
A similar situation may occur with economic rapprochement with China. The disproportionate economic and political weight with China puts Kazakhstan in a clearly losing position when disagreements arise.As the experience of unresolved problems of transboundary rivers and the ongoing oppression of Kazakhs in Xinjiang shows, China takes a principled position in clashes of interests, despite assurances of friendship from high tribunes [25].
Why are people unhappy?
The increasing number of protests and a record number of votes for the opposition candidate in the presidential elections indicate issues of mutual understanding between the authorities and the people. For example, the official data on average wages (163 thousand tenge), inflation (5.3%) and unemployment (4.9%), which the population believes to be “embellished,” and statements about the average family income of 500 thousand tenge, indicate that the government sees a distorted picture [21; 26]. In addition, the need to create a National Council of Public Trust indicates that the government does not receive feedback from the population through elected representatives.
An additional source of frustration for the people is the disproportionate distribution of benefits from attracted foreign investments. According to Credit Swiss, 162 people own 55% of Kazakhstan's wealth ($34 billion) [27]. This information, combined with the stagnation of real wages since 2013 and instances where Kazakhstani workers are underpaid by up to 10 times at foreign enterprises, creates the impression that the benefits of foreign investments are being unevenly distributed[21; 28].
These facts raise concerns among the population that the interests of ordinary Kazakhstanis will not be heard and taken into account when implementing Chinese investment projects.
These facts raise concerns among the population that the interests of ordinary Kazakhstanis will not be heard and taken into account when implementing Chinese investment projects.
Figure 11. Real wage index, as a percentage of the previous year
Based on data from the Statistics Committee of the Ministry of National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan [21]
Conclusions
The root cause of the potential risks from cooperation lies more in us than in China's power and efforts to promote its interests. Lack of transparency and corruption create prerequisites for the implementation of overpriced and economically impractical projects. The inability to defend state interests and the lack of inclusivity in distributing the benefits of foreign investments cast doubt on the profitability of closer cooperation with China for Kazakhstani citizens.
Cooperation with China should take place, but preferably without debt burdens or the sale of strategic assets and agricultural land. In this case, mutual trade and cargo transit could be the optimal model for coexistence.
Cooperation with China should take place, but preferably without debt burdens or the sale of strategic assets and agricultural land. In this case, mutual trade and cargo transit could be the optimal model for coexistence.
References:
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4. «On investments in fixed capital in the Republic of Kazakhstan for January-December 2018”, Committee on Statistics of the Ministry of National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan. URL:http://old.stat.gov.kz/faces/wcnav_externalId/homeNumbersInvestment?_afrLoop=3953561555578497#%40%3F_afrLoop%3D3953561555578497%26_adf.ctrl-state%3D1bf0cmfskf_38
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9. How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port, The New York Times, 2018. URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html?fbclid=IwAR3GCJ4_RDaoq8sxZx373t9gudX_oEv7ziKjdfVj1c8oBADPN5Pbf6GkXdE
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13. Kenya’s Chinese-built railway is a hit with travellers, but is this safari line a massive white elephant?, South China Morning Post, 2019. URL: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3019603/kenyas-chinese-built-railway-hit-travellers-safari-line
14. Corruption Perceptions Index 2018., Transparency International. URL: https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018
15. The capital's court suspected the head of Huawei Technologies Kazakhstan of violating the law on combating corruption, Time, 2019. URL: https://time.kz/articles/nu/2019/08/16/vot-vam-i-huavej
16. Tokayev criticized the LRT project in the capital, Tengrinews, 2019. URL: https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/tokaev-raskritikoval-proekt-lrt-v-stolitse-373862/
17. The final cost of LRT in Nur-Sultan has been announced, Tengrinews, 2019. URL: https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/nazvana-itogovaya-stoimost-lrt-v-nur-sultane-375208/
18. Tashkent metro for 295 million dollars – is it expensive or not?, Centre1, 2017. URL: https://centre1.com/uzbekistan/metro-v-tashkente-za-295-mln-dollarov-eto-dorogo-ili-net/
19. State programs, Information and legal system of regulatory legal acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan Adilet. URL: State Program for Industrial and Innovative Development http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/U1400000874, Business Roadmap http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P1800000522, Digital Kazakhstan http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P1700000827
20. Russia accounts for 92% of Kazakhstan's trade turnover with the EAEU, Kapital, 2019. URL:
https://kapital.kz/economic/76237/v-tovarooborote-kazakhstana-s-yeaes-92-zanimayet-rossiya.html
21. Main socio-economic indicators of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Committee on Statistics of the Ministry of National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2019. URL: http://old.stat.gov.kz/faces/homePage/homeDinamika.pokazateli?_afrLoop=4038279262548546#%40%3F_afrLoop%3D4038279262548546%26_adf.ctrl-state%3D142qk50oeq_38
22. Lukashenko and Tokayev accused the EAEU countries of creating barriers to trade, Interfax, 2019. URL: https://www.interfax.ru/world/678700
23. The protective duty will lead to an increase in the cost of air transportation in the EAEU countries – Air Astana, KazTAG, 2019. URL: https://kaztag.info/ru/news/zagraditelnaya-poshlina-privedet-k-udorozhaniyu-aviaperevozok-v-stranakh-eaes-air-astana
24. A fly in the ointment: why the sugar issue arose between Russia and Kazakhstan, Sputnik, 2019. URL:https://ru.sputniknews.kz/economy/20190422/9914686/sahar-russia-kazakhstan-eaehs.html
25. New loan from China without mention of previous debts, Radio Azattyk, 2018. URL: https://rus.azattyq.org/a/nazarbayev-vizit-v-pekin-investicii/29279262.html
26. Nazarbayev: a family in Kazakhstan earns an average of 500 thousand tenge, Sputnik, 2018. URL: https://ru.sputniknews.kz/radio/20181229/8683795/nazarbaev-srednyaya-zarplata-kazahstan.html
27. Almost 97% of Kazakhstanis live in survival mode - E. Yesimkhanov, Matrica.kz, 2019. URL: http://www.matritca.kz/news/66555-pochti-97-procentov-kazahstancev-zhivut-v-rezhime-vyzhivaniya-eesimhanov.html
28. Minister reported on the difference in salaries of Kazakhs and foreigners, Tengrinews, 2019. URL: https://tengrinews.kz/private_finance/ministr-soobschil-raznitse-zarplate-kazahstantsev-381499/